Nate Jones. The article, however, includes some factual inaccuracies that the recent declassification of documents can correct. Firstly, Able Archer 83 was not held from 2—11 November, as Barrass writes. In this vein, recently declassified British Ministry of Defence documents provided to the Nuclear Information Service are stark. The most comprehensive British JIC report on the episode also remains classified.
I very much doubt that. On the exact timing of Able Archer 83 , I find the dates of 2—11 November to be the most helpful. The nuclear-release part of the exercise began on 7 November; the scenario of conflict started on 4 November, but 2 November was the date set by the Soviet General Staff for some Soviet forces to go onto a higher state of alert.
Lower-level nuclear-training exercises, to check the skills of nuclear-force personnel under very strict security conditions, took place throughout the year. None of the cases cited by Mr Jones in his letter carry with them firm dates showing that they were in the time frame 2—11 November, let alone that of 7—11 November.
No dates are given. Moreover, the fact that Pershing launchers would deploy to nearby dispersal sites and activate the communications sets to simulate the receipt of nuclear-release messages does not make Able Archer a field-training exercise.
If the US were to launch a surprise first strike against the Soviet Union it would not begin with strike aircraft or intercontinental ballistic missiles, but with Pershing IIs. And, as I remarked above, those missiles had not yet been deployed to West Germany, let alone readied for use. That remark should be taken with a good pinch of salt. While there is no doubt that many Soviet people were scared, some even fearing the worst, those closest to the hard realities of nuclear war — Yuri Andropov, Dmitry Ustinov, the General Staff and the GRU — did not expect a first strike during Able Archer.
